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THE DEMOCRACY-FORCING
CONSTITUTION
Neal Devins*
ONE

CASE

AT A TIME:

JUDICIAL

MINIMALISM

ON THE SUPREME

COURT. By Cass R. Sunstein. Cambridge: Harvard University

Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 290. $29.95.

During my freshmanyear in college, I was told not to judge a
book by its cover. The book in question - Lolita; the cover suggested something quite salacious. My professor explained that a
soldier, who had purchasedLolita to work out some of the kinks of
militarylife, found himself tossing the book out, proclaimingin disgust "Literature!"Well, I cannot claim preciselythe same reaction
to Cass Sunstein's One Case at a Time1 (my expectations were
lower than the soldier's). Nevertheless, for those expecting a lefty
defense of judicial restraint,One Case at a Timeis not your book.
Rather, Sunstein very much wants the Supreme Court to play an
active role in abortion,affirmativeaction,the rightto die, and much
more. But Sunstein'sbrand of activismis minimalist. Rather than
look to the judiciaryto settle these issues once and for all, Sunstein
sees the Court as a "democracyforcing" facilitator, encouraging
elected governmentand the people to engage in constructiveconstitutionaldialogues.2
As rallyingcries go, Sunstein'splea for judicialminimalismhas
broad appeal. After all, social conservativesstill complain about
judge-made rights and the left, smarting from several Rehnquist
Court defeats, increasinglysees elected governmentas more apt to
embrace their agenda than the judiciary. With both sides ready to
jettison judicial activism,judicial minimalismseems an idea whose
time has come.
Indeed, as Sunsteintells it, his brandof minimalismhas already
arrived. Proclaiming minimalism "the most striking feature of
Americanlaw in the 1990s"(p. xi), Sunsteinarguesthat the Courtis
* Goodrich Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government,
College of William and
Mary. A.B. 1978, Georgetown; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt. -Ed. Thanks to Akhil Amar, Alan
Meese, John McGinnis, and Mark Tushnet for their helpful comments in reading a draft of
this review.
1. Cass Sunstein is the Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of
Chicago.
2. For another treatment of how the Court ought to decide cases to promote democratic
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cautious about imposing its views on the rest of society, "prefer[ring]to leave fundamentalissues undecided"(p. x). In this way,
Sunsteinsees JusticeSandraDay O'Connor(and to a lesser extent
Justice Anthony Kennedy) as part of a solid block of minimalist
Justices (that also include Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,Souter, and
Stevens).3
By simultaneouslyembracingminimalismand treating it as a

fait accompli, One Case at a Time's subtitle ought to be the more
emphatic The King is Dead; Long Live the King!, not the drab Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court. But drabness may well be

the effect that Sunsteincovets. By speakingin such a matter-of-fact
tone, One Case at a Time suggests a bloodless revolution that has
run its course. Put anotherway, Sunsteinsees himself as the victor
and One Case at a Timea retrospectivemanifesto that will explain
the soundness of his victory.
Remarkably,Sunsteinaccomplishesthis feat with hardlya mention of what many consider the classic minimalisttract, Alexander
Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch.4 According to Bickel, the

Supreme Court ought to avoid debilitating conflicts with elected
governmentby making use of the "passivevirtues,"that is, proceduralandjurisdictionaldelays that provide a "timelag between legislation and adjudication."5But for Sunstein, the question is not
"when"the Court ought to resolve a constitutionaldispute. The
question,instead,is "how"the Courtought to make its voice heard.
One Caseat a Time'sstated goal "is to identifyand defend a distinctive form of judicial decision-making"(p. ix).
By focusingon "how"the Courtought to decide cases before it,
Sunsteinpays only lip serviceto those limitsin judicialcapacitythat
justify Courtinvocationsof the "passivevirtues." In this way, One
Case at a Time pays insufficientattention to the reasons why the
Supreme Court ought to craft minimalist opinions. Although
Sunsteinacknowledgesseveralpowerfulreasonssupportingjudicial
minimalism(inherent limits both in the Court'sfactfindingpowers
and the Court'sabilityto compel elected officialsto implementpoliticallyunpopulardecisions), One Case at a Timelargelyoverlooks
these justifications. In this way, One Case at a Time is not at all
hinged to some vision of the Court's institutional strengths and
weaknesses. Instead, the focus of One Case at a Timeis a delineation of how a minimalistCourtwould tackle those issues that have
3. According to this account, the Justices most interested in "lay[ing] down clear, brightline rules" that will bind both the Court and elected officials are Justices Clarence Thomas
and Antonin Scalia, as well Chief Justice William Rehnquist. See p. xiii.
BRANCH(1962). Sunstein acknowlM. BICKEL,THE LEASTDANGEROUS
4. ALEXANDER
edges that a minimalist Court might well make use of the "passive virtues." Pp. 5, 39-40. But
Sunstein does not return to this theme in any meaningful way.
5. BICKEL,supra note 4, at 116.
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divided the nation duringthe 1990s - the right to die, affirmative
action, governmentlinedrawingon the basis of sex and sexual orientation, and the relationshipbetween the First Amendment and
new technologies. It also advancesthe highlydebatableproposition
that minimalistdecisionmaking,in fact, will improve the quality of
constitutionaldiscourseoutside the courts (pp. 25-27).
In this review, I will argue that inherentlimits in judicialcapacity supporta more expansivevision of judicialminimalismthan the
one articulatedby Sunstein. In particular,certiorari denials and
other "passivevirtues"work hand-in-glovewith Sunstein'sbrandof
minimalism. Sunsteinacknowledgesthis but does not seriouslyconsider how the constructiveuses of the "passivevirtues"will advance
his project. In other words, Sunstein is too obsessed with the
democracy-forcingnature of judicial review to see how his and
Alexander Bickel's brand of minimalismcomplementeach other.
But the problem with One Case at a Timeis not simply that it
does not go far enough. In critical respects, Sunstein's brand of
minimalismgoes too far. By making democraticdeliberationand
not some theory of what the Constitutionmeans the lodestar of his
proposal,Sunsteinnever considersthe possibilitythat the Supreme
Court ought to speak to basic questions of values on matters that
divide the nation. While it often makes sense to defer such decisions, the Courtshould not put off such decisionsforever. Whether
the issue is abortion, affirmativeaction, or the death penalty, the
Court's unique voice ought not to be muted simply because its
members are appointed,not elected. Sunstein'sbrand of minimalism, however, allows for "maximalist"decisionmakingin very limited circumstances - when such a decision would cement a
preexistingsocietal consensus.
Constitutional dialogues between the Court, elected government, and the people go a long way towardsmaking the Constitution more relevant and stable.6 For these dialogues to occur, the
Court cannot simply engage in minimalistdecisionmaking.Rather,
there are times when the Court must shape political and popular
discourse - just as there are times when the Court ought to be
shaped by the world around it. Of course, the Court may sometimes opt to function as a facilitatorof a dialogue between elected
government and the people (as Sunstein proposes) or it may opt
out of the controversy altogether (as Bickel suggests). But the
Court'svoice is simplytoo importantto leave the basic questionsof
constitutional decisionmakingexclusively in the hands of democratic government.
6. Along with Lou Fisher, I have developed this point elsewhere. See Neal Devins &
Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83 (1998). See also
infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.

Michigan Law Review

1974

[Vol. 97:1971

In the end, Cass Sunstein's One Case at a Time is provocative,
important, and helpful. But it is also incomplete. While the
SupremeCourtwould do well to leave most fundamentalquestions
undecided, Sunstein does not satisfactorilycome to grips with the
possibility that the Court ought to tackle some issues head on and
duck some issues altogether.
I.

MINIMALISM, THE JUDICIAL ROLE, AND THE
DEMOCRATIC PROJECT

Startingwith Marburyv. Madison,the Supreme Court has been
attacked for addressingissues not before it.7 No doubt, when the
Court "seek[s]to decide cases in a way that sets broad rules for the
future and that also gives ambitious theoretical justificationsfor
outcomes" (p. 9), the Court risks making costly mistakes. Witness,
for example, the damage that both the Court and the nation suffered as a result of the Lochner8era, a period from 1905 to 1937 in
which the Court infused laissez-faire economics into the due process clause to strike down roughlytwo hundredsocial and economic
laws.9 An enduring Depression made a mockery of the factual
premise of Lochner'sfree market philosophy.10By 1937, populist,
political, and academic attacks against the Court prompted a fullscale judicial retreat.
How then to avoid such debacles? One Case at a Timesuggests
that Court decisionmakingshould be both narrowand shallow. By
narrow, Sunstein means that the Justices should only decide the
case before them, saying nothing (if possible) about the range of
cases that raise related issues (p. 10). By shallow, Sunsteincalls for
"incompletelytheorized agreements,"that is, decisional rules that
do not establish basic principles so that "people who disagree on
the deepest issues [can] converge"(p. 11). Needless to say, the decisions of the Lochner Court were wide and deep.
Narrowand shallow decisionmaking,then, is "likelyto make judicial errors less frequent and (above all) less damaging"(p. 4).
Correspondingly,perceiving that "[f]ar more progress might be
made through an empiricallyinformed constitutionallaw" (p. 255),
7. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). For the classic critique of Marbury, see William Van Alstyne, A
Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
8. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
9. There is some reason to think that the Lochner era was not all bad. David Bernstein,
for example, makes a fairly persuasive case that racial minorities were well served by "right
to contract" decisionmaking that resulted in the invalidation, among other things, of restrictive covenants. See David E. Bernstein, Phillip Sober Controlling Phillip Drunk: Buchanan
v. Warley in Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797 (1998).
10. For a competing perspective, see Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and the Mistranslation of Liberty, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
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judicial minimalism affords courts an opportunity to learn more
about the consequences of different rules. "[U]nintended social
consequences"(p. 120), includingelected governmentresistanceto
Court decisionmaking, also suggest that the Court should look
before it leaps.
At this level, Sunstein'sminimalismis highly pragmatic.For example, when "the relevant facts are in flux and changingvery rapidly, and the consequences of current developments are hard to
foresee" (p. 174), the Court ought to exercise cautionbefore invalidating regulating controls. For this reason, it is hard to disagree
with Sunstein'scall for minimalistreview of the regulation of the
Internetand other new communicationstechnologies (pp. 194-201).
Furthermore,lacking the powers of purse and sword, the Court
must recognize that its power lies "in its legitimacy, a product of
substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary."11Otherwise, the Court risks both populist
attacks on its legitimacyand elected governmentreprisals.
Sunstein'sminimalismgoes well beyond the costs of judicialerror, however. The "connection between judicial minimalismand
democratic self-government"is Sunstein's "most important goal"
(p. xiv). Specifically,perceiving deliberation about constitutional
ideals as promoting"a democraticnation's highest aspirations"(p.
xiv), Sunsteindefendsjudicialminimalismabove all on the grounds
that it will catalyze democratic processes "rather than preempt
democraticdeliberation"(p. xiv).
This brandof minimalism,however, is hardlya call for majority
rule. Sunstein wants deliberationmore than anythingelse. To accomplish this feat, the Court cannot simply stand on the sidelines,
rubber-stampingelected governmentdecisionmaking.Correspondingly, while Sunstein acknowledgesthat a minimalistCourt might
use standing,ripeness, certioraridenials, and the like to steer clear
of constitutionaldisputes,One Caseat a Timedoes not considerthe
circumstancesin which the "passivevirtues"ought to be invoked.
The name of the game is how Court decisions can spur elected officials and the people to deliberate over the Constitution'smeaning,
not whether the Court ought to steer clear of certain disputes.
Words and deeds, not passivity, are essential to this lofty task.
"Minimalistjudges,"accordingto this account,"are entirelywilling
to invalidatesome laws ... [for] [m]ajoritarianism
is itself a form of
maximalism"(p. x).
What is striking here is that Sunstein suggests that Supreme
Court Justicesshould care more about encouragingdemocraticdeliberationthan correctlydecidingthe case before them. Under this
11. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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view, a minimalistCourtmay well invalidategovernmentalconduct
that is constitutionalin order to promote democraticdeliberation.
When it comes to affirmativeaction, for example, Sunstein commends the Court for its occasional invalidationof such programs
while, withoutblinking,offeringa spiriteddefense of why such programs are constitutional(pp. 125-29). Moreover, noting that the
argumentsfor and against affirmativeaction "have not received
much in the way of a public airinguntil the last several years" (p.
117), Sunstein applaudsthe Court for "helpingto stimulatepublic
processes" through its "complex, rule-free, highly particularistic
opinions"(p. 118). Specifically,since neither proponentsnor opponents of race preferences can count on the Court to behave in a
predictableway, both sides of the affirmativeaction wars have incentives to participatein an ongoing conversationabout the soundness of preferences. For Sunstein,this Court-inspireddiscussionof
affirmativeaction's underlying questions of policy and principle
may well stem the "publicbacklashagainst affirmativeaction" (p.
130). But even if this does not occur, Sunsteinsees the judicialrole
as salutary,notwithstandinghis belief that the constitutionalattacks
against affirmativeaction are unconvincing.
Sunstein'sdiscussionof affirmativeaction is revealingfor other
reasons. First, perceiving that "judicialsignaling"can shape the
content of "public discussion"(p. 131), Sunstein appears to embrace the view that Supreme Court decisions serve a vital educational function, offering lessons that inspire citizens to think
seriously about constitutionalissues.12 Second, by democraticdeliberation,Sunsteindoes not mean direct democracy. In discussing
the recent spate of citizen initiativeson affirmativeaction, Sunstein
suggests an "unusuallyhigh degree of skepticism"by reviewing
courts might be appropriate(p. 134). Warningof the danger of
"we-they thinking"and fearful that "a careful assessment of facts
and values" will not dominate citizen balloting, Sunstein both defends "the ordinary(and constitutionallycentral)filters of political
representation"and suggests that "politically insulated groups"
ought to sort out the actual effects of affirmativeaction.13Third,
Sunstein sees little value in stare decisis or other rule of law constraints. His call for nongeneralizable"fact-specific"decisionmaking is directlyat odds with the belief that "settl[ing]authoritatively
what is to be done" is a critical function of law and, as such, the
12. On this point, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961 (1992); Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of
Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1952). For further discussion, see infra Part III.
13. Pp. 133-34. Apparently, elected officials would then act upon this information. The
question of what role, if any, interest groups should play in affecting elected government
decisionmaking is not addressed by Sunstein. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 68-69.
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Supreme Court contributes to political stability through its interpretations of the Constitution.14
One Case at a Time, ultimately, is a paean for the Court to keep
its options open - speaking out in ways that give neither side of an
issue a complete victory. This is true even on matters where the
Court should defer to reasonable legislative judgments. On
physician-assisted suicide, for example, Sunstein argues that with
"no palpable defect in the system of democratic deliberation" (p.
102), the Court should not "intrude into ongoing deliberative
processes in circumstances in which reasonable people might differ"
(p. 101). Rather, it ought to allow "diverse solutions in diverse
states" (p. 101). At the same time, however, Sunstein contends that
the Court should assume that there is a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide (pp. 93-94). Under this approach, the Court
would serve as a czar of reasonableness, ensuring that the state has
good reason to interfere with this hypothesized fundamental liberty
interest.15

The explanation for an ongoing judicial role here is that the issue of physician-assisted suicide is highly contested and, as such, the
circumstances warranting a maximalist (wide and deep) decision
are not present. For Sunstein, wide and deep decisions cement a
societal consensus and must therefore be "earned by both thought
and experience."16 Democratic deliberation, in contrast, best occurs in the shadow of uncertainty. Unless and until that uncertainty
becomes irrelevant (because a consensus is reached), the prospect
of active judicial review is a necessary component of Sunstein's
minimalist creed.
In advancing this argument, Sunstein goes out of his way to depict the core of the current Court as minimalist. Indeed, his case
studies focus on decisions that he deems minimalist and, hence, cor-

14. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying
notes 75-76.
15. For Sunstein, the implementation of this model will be anything but disruptive, for
there are several reasonable grounds for state "intrusions" of this hypothesized right. See pp.
94-98. With that said, Sunstein seems to embrace a right to physician-assisted suicide under
hopeless conditions. Pp. 88-90.
16. P. 257. Sunstein provides little guidance on how much consensus is needed before the
Court issues a maximalist opinion. Sunstein likewise says very little about how to measure
societal consensus - opinion polls, elite opinion, whatever. Furthermore, in his discussion of
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), Sunstein endorses the Court's deep "contentious" repudiation of the Virginia Military Institute's exclusion of women. See pp. 163-70.
Qualifying his basic claim, Sunstein argues that "a deep understanding of a constitutional
provision is nothing to lament when a variety of justices can converge on it (and we) have
good reason to believe that it is right." P. 170. As to who the "we" are, Sunstein does not
say.
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rectly decided.17 For Justices (like Sandra Day O'Connor) who are
sometimes described as willing participants in a conservative counterrevolution, Sunstein suggests that their flag flies elsewhere. One
Case at a Time, in this way, is intended to help Court watchers (and
even Justices?) understand both the Rehnquist Court's emerging
legacy "and to defend its controversial way of proceeding as admirably well suited to a number of issues on which the nation is currently in moral flux" (p. xiv).
II.

A

KINDER, GENTLER MINIMALISM?

One Case at a Time's call for narrow and shallow decisionmaking is sound in critical respects. To start with, the factual assumptions that underlie One Case at a Time are correct. Inherent
limits in judicial factfinding suggest that courts are apt to be mistaken in their judgments. In part, courts cannot escape "the unfortunate consequences of judicial ignorance of the social realities
behind the issues with which they grapple."18 As Judge Richard
Posner puts it: "The first thing the courts have to learn is how little
they know."19 While better social science research can help solve
this problem (assuming that there are answers to questions like
"what is the cause of homosexuality?" or "do the costs of single sex
education outweigh its benefits?"), courts nevertheless will be
shackled by the temporal and reactive nature of litigation. Specifically, with judges and advocates relying on precedent-based legal
arguments, courts simply cannot engage in thorough cost-benefit
analysis.20 Courts are also hamstrung in that they decide cases at a
17. While conceding that one must be "attuned to the Court's minimalist tendencies" to
recognize that some of these decisions, in fact, are minimalist, Sunstein argues that the
Rehnquist Court defines its mission narrowly. See p. xii. For example, while recognizing that
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in the physician-assisted suicide decision (limiting
the Court's power to create fundamental rights to "deeply rooted . . . traditions and practices") is anything but minimalist, Sunstein claims that, upon closer inspection, five members
of the Court adopted a minimalist approach. See pp. xii, 77 (discussing Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)). But there is reason to question Sunstein's depiction of the
Rehnquist Court's minimalist tendencies. On physician-assisted suicide, for example, Sunstein does not take into account that lower courts (or the Supreme Court in a subsequent
decision) may be more attuned to the fact that five members of the Court signed onto the
Rehnquist opinion. See Michael W. McConnell, Supreme Humility, WALLST. J., July 2,1997,
at A14. For similar reasons, Rehnquist Court affirmative action decisions can be recalibrated
into something quite maximalist. See infra text accompanying notes 56-62. Furthermore, by
only considering a subset of the Court's decisionmaking, Sunstein does not consider arguably
maximalist Rehnquist Court decisionmaking, including the Court's invalidation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Brady handgun legislation, and 1996 line item veto legislation. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
18. Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1998).
19. Id. at 18.
20. Cost-benefit review, of course, is one of the hallmarks of the administrative state.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993) (requiring cost-benefit review of agency
rulemaking).
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moment in time so that a changed understandingof the underlying
facts can only be corrected through a reversal.21 Moreover,
notwithstandingamicus curiaefilings, the Court often relies on the
argumentsmade by the parties before it, and the parties before it
frequently frame the issues that the Court will consider. Correspondingly,the Court may "anchor"its decisionmakingon its perceptions of whether the parties before it are sympatheticor not.
Problemsmay arise, however, when differentparties raisingidentical legal issues may appear more or less sympatheticand, as such,
the Court'sdecision may well be tied to the accidentof whichplaintiff presents its case to the Court.22
Beyond the Court'spropensityto get the facts wrong, the risks
of elected governmentreprisalsto unpopulardecisionmakingmay
well be too great to warrant wide and deep decisionmakingon
highly contested issues. Consider,for example, Roe v. Wade.23By
groundingits decision in a woman's right to bodily integrity and
prohibitingstate regulation of abortion during the first trimester,
Roe is an extraordinarilywide decision. Indeed, this was the
Court'sintent. JusticeHarryBlackmunadvancedhis trimestertest
to forestall future governmentefforts to sidestep the decision and,
in so doing, to settle the abortion controversyonce and for all.24
From 1973 to 1989, however, 306 abortion-restrictingmeasures
were passed by forty-eightstates.25 In 1992, after twenty years of
elected government resistance as well as the appointmentof new
Supreme Court Justices, the Court responded to these pressures
and returnedmuch of the decisionmakingpower related to this divisive issue back to the states. For this reason, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg,in December 1992,lambastedRoe for "prolong[ing]divisiveness and deferr[ing]stable settlement of the [abortion]issue"
by short-circuitingearly 1970s legislative reform efforts.26
The political maelstromthat followed Roe, of course, is unique.
Nevertheless, there are countless examples of elected government
21. Correspondingly, judges must operate around "real time" constraints, that is, courts
cannot defer decisions on the cases before them. In particular, rather than risk a backlog of
cases, judges must do the best they can with the information that they have.
22. For an overview treatment of anchoring and other behavioral economics topics, see
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998).
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24. See DAVIDJ. GARROW,LIBERTYANDSEXUALITY:THERIGHTTOPRIVACYANDTHE
MAKINGOF ROE V. WADE585-87 (1994).
25. See NEAL DEVINS,SHAPINGCONSTITUTIONAL
VALUES60-63 (1996).
26. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1208
(1992). For an argument that the states were unlikely to liberalize abortion rights, see David
Garrow, History Lesson for the Judge: What Clinton's Supreme Court Nominee Doesn't
Know About Roe, WASH.POST,June 20, 1993, at C3.
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attackingunpopularSupremeCourt decisionmaking.27Indeed, the
historicalrecord makes clear that the Court is hardlyever successful "in blockinga determinedand persistentlawmakingmajorityon
a majorpolicy."28Rather,the "policyviews dominanton the Court
are never long out of line with the policy views dominantamongthe
lawmakingmajorities of the United States."29None of this is to
suggestthat court-orderedreformis a "hollowhope"30;it is to suggest, however, that courts should look before they leap.
Sunstein, in his brief discussion of Roe, echoes these themes.
Depicting the post-Roe social upheaval as "destructiveand unnecessary," he argues that the Court ought to have proceeded narrowly, engaging "in a form of dialogue with the political process"
(p. 114). The question remains: How does the Court proceed narrowly? One Case at a Time answersthis question by extolling the
virtues of narrow and shallow decisionmaking. The possibility of
steering clear of controversyaltogether,by employingthe "passive
virtues,"is not factoredinto the equation(at least not in a meaningful way).31 Here, I think, Sunstein loses the forest for the trees.
WarrenCourtefforts to eradicateracialsegregationin the postBrown32 South highlightwhy it is that the Court must sometimes
walk away from controversy. To begin with, the Court'sdecisions
in Brown are extraordinarilyshallow. Ratherthan requiresouthern
systemsto take concrete steps to dismantledual school systems,the
Court recognizedthat "variedlocal problems"were best solved by
"[s]choolauthorities,"that districtcourt judges were best suited to
examine "local conditions," and that delays associated with
"problemsrelated to administration"were to be expected.33 By
recognizingthat "some achievable remedial effectiveness may be
sacrificedbecauseof other social interests"and that "a limitedremedy [may be chosen] when a more effective one is too costly to
27. For a sampling, see Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICALDYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1996).

28. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. LAW279, 286 (1957).
29. Id. at 285. For other treatments
DIALOGUES

(1988);

GERALD

of this subject, see Louis

ROSENBERG,

THE

HOLLOW

FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL

HOPE:

CAN

COURTS

BRING

ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL.SCI. REV. 795 (1975); Symposium, Elected Branch Influences in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 56 LAW& CONTEMP.
PROBS.,Autumn 1993, at 1.
30. ROSENBERG,
supra note 29. For critiques of Rosenberg, see generally, Neal Devins,
Judicial Matters, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1992); Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and
Social Reform, 102 YALE. L.J. 1763 (1993).
31. Sunstein, for example, never explains how (if ever) a minimalist Court ought to employ the "passive virtues."
32. See Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (unanimous decision).
33. 349 U.S. at 299-300.

May 1999]

Judicial Minimalism

1981

other interests,"34 the Justices sought to improve the acceptability
of their decision by speaking in a single moderate voice.
More striking, following its rulings in Brown, the Court steered
clear of the school desegregation issue for a decade.35 Indeed, well
aware of the "momentum of history" and the "deep feeling" people
had about school segregation, the Court refused to hear a 1955
challenge to Virginia's miscegenation law rather than risk "thwarting or seriously handicapping" its decision in Brown and, with it, its
institutional prestige.36 In particular, with critics of Brown warning
that integrated schools would produce a "mongrelization" of the
white race, the Justices were unwilling to place themselves "into the
vortex of the present disquietude .. . [and risk] the carrying-out of
the Court's decree."37
By 1964, however, Congress and the White House - through
the monumental

1964 Civil Rights Act38

made clear that they

were prepared to lend their institutional support to the dismantling
of single-race schools. It was against this backdrop that the Warren
Court finally returned to school desegregation, declaring in 1964
that "the time for mere deliberate speed has run out."39 This paral-

lelism should come as no surprise. Unlike Brown, when judicial intervention ran against the grain of majoritarian preferences, courtordered reform was now consistent with the initiatives taken by the
elected branches. In 1967, with the principle of desegregation
safely established, the Justices revisited the miscegenation question,
unanimously striking down the Virginia statute.40
The Court's ability to navigate desegregation (at least before
forced busing, when judicial hubris overtook common sense) is
truly remarkable. It reveals that the Court can pursue radical social
change while taking into account inherent limits in its authority.
What would have happened if the Court followed this course on
34. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 599 (1983). Cass Sunstein
clearly embraces this type of shallow decisionmaking. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 50-51 (1996).
35. During this period, its only foray into school desegregation was Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958), a decision reprimanding Arkansas governor Orval Faubus for blocking school
desegregation in Little Rock. But Cooper was all symbolism and no substance, for the
Court's decision occurred the year after President Dwight Eisenhower sent federal troops
into Little Rock to force compliance with the district court's order in the case.
36. Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority:
Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423, 1476 & n.317 (1994) (quoting a Nov. 4,
1955 memorandum from Justice Felix N. Frankfurter to the Conference).
37. Id. For the classic defense of the Court's action, see BICKEL,supra note 4, at 174; for
the classic critique, see Herbert Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959).
38. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. ? 2000 et seq.
(1994)).
39. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
40. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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abortion, issuing a less ambitious decision in Roe and then steering
clear of the controversy for several years? Would the acrimony that
followed in Roe's wake have been moderated? Quite possibly.
First, populist resistance to Roe, in part, is a by product of the decision's absolutist nature. A decision permitting rape victims to seek
abortions and no more would have held open the possibility that
the Court might well approve less draconian regulations. In so ruling, the Court would have appeared less extreme and, as such, may
not have galvanized pro-life interests. Second, a more ambiguous
decision might well have spurred the pro-choice community into action. Roe and its progeny, by assuring pro-choicers that they could
not lose the benefits they had won, eliminated the demand for prochoice legislation. Otherwise, pro-choice and pro-life interests
would have pursued abortion legislation in the shadow of constitutional uncertainty. Over time, it is possible that some consensus
would have emerged.41
The lesson here is simple: Courts do not resolve contentious
social questions once and for all in a single decision. Rather, Court
decisionmaking ought to leave room for democratic deliberation,
including populist resistance. Sunstein, as his criticism of Roe
makes clear, understands this. Indeed, in some ways, this is the
point of One Case at a Time. By not considering how it is that the
"passive virtues" fit into this equation, however, a key element is
missing from Sunstein's elaboration of how a minimalist Court
should behave. Specifically, the "passive virtues" allow a minimalist Court to take the long view. By seeing each decision (including
a decision not to decide) as part of a broader mosaic, the Court can
allow time for cultural norms to change and settle so that its decisions can win wider acceptability.42
Delay makes sense for other reasons. As Sunstein recognizes,
Court decisionmaking ought to be minimalist, in part, because the
Court will sometimes get the facts wrong. But limitations in the
Court's factfinding may also warrant delaying strategies. This, I
think, is particularly true in separation of powers decisionmaking.43
41. There is reason to think that a narrow ruling in Roe would have had this effect. Following the Court's narrow decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey - reaffirming Roe while
expanding state regulatory authority - a consensus of sorts has emerged. Most significantly,
the pace of abortion-related legislation has slowed dramatically. States no longer pursue
legislative initiatives outlawing abortion. Rather, notwithstanding the recent furor over partial birth abortion, the focus of state action involves restrictions approved by the Court: waiting periods, informed consent requirements, and parental notification. See DEVINS,supra
note 25, at 73-74.
42. Cultural norms, of course, may not change. As to whether the Court should risk
political reprisals in such circumstances, see infra text accompanying notes 77-80.
43. Sunstein limits his "applications" to speech, equality, and privacy cases. Since One
Case at a Time advances a generalist model of Court decisionmaking, this purposeful narrowing of focus is unfortunate.
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Unlike most challenges to a congressionalstatute, the frequent interplay between the branches can make the ultimate impact of a
new rule quite unpredictable,just as the political accommodations
between the branches can redefine or even undo the substantive
impact.44For this reason, certioraridenials,findingsof no ripeness,
and the like are particularlyappropriatein this context. Take the
line-item veto. Will it be used by the Presidentto threatenindividual members of Congresssimply to pursue executive pet projects?
Or will it serve as a defensive mechanismto protect the President
from "veto proof" continuingresolutions? In other words, will it
transformthe substantivequality of legislationin a significantway,
and if so, in what direction? Moreover, will experience with the
line-item veto affect the ultimate operation of this device? That is,
will Congressand the White House recalibratetheir budgetarypolicymakingagainst the backdropof their experiences with the lineitem veto?45
The independent counsel statute provides another example of
this phenomenon. Ten years ago, in concludingthat the statute was
constitutional,the Courtfound that the Attorney Generalexercised
meaningful control over independent counsel investigations and
that, in any event, the statute did not undermine the President's
ability to manage the executive branch.46With the benefit of ten
years hindsight,of course, these conclusionsseem, well, suspect.
Delay, as Alexander Bickel put it, has the advantageof allowing
the "full political and historical context, the relationshipbetween
the Court and the representativeinstitutionsof government"to be
made clearer.47While delay may not always be practicalor necessary,48a minimalistCourt should see great advantagein delaying
strategies. Sunstein very much embracescertain types of delaying
strategies. His notion that Court decisionmakingought to be narrow and shallow, that the Court's reasoning ought to be incom44. Mike Fitts and I develop this point in Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph
of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the Modern Supreme Court's Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEO. L.J. 351, 367-68 (1997).
45. The answer to these questions remains a mystery, for the Court - in a maximalist
opinion - struck down the line-item veto statute before Congress and the White House had
significant experience negotiating around it. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
46. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
47. See BICKEL,supra note 4, at 124.
48. In the independent counsel case, for example, a lower court finding that the statute
was unconstitutional, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), made it impractical for
the Court to refuse to hear the case. Otherwise, the statute would have been effectively
voided in the D.C. Circuit, the very circuit in which a three-judge panel appoints independent
counsels. With that said, the Court could have issued (d la Sunstein) a narrower opinion, one
that left open the question of whether the President's control of the executive branch might
be undermined by the statute. Such a decision would have sent a cautionary note to zealous
independent counsels, whereas Morrison is a green light for monomaniacal prosecutors to
push the envelope as far as it will go.
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pletely theorized, and that issues ought to be left undecided,in the
end, is a rallying cry for delay. In this way, One Case at a Time
sounds a similartheme to the Least DangerousBranch. Nevertheless, Sunstein commits error by presentinga theory of minimalism
that does not take into account the appropriateuses of the "passive" virtues. Rather, by limiting his project to merits-baseddecisionmaking, One Case at a Time is anything but a plea for the
judiciaryto steer clear of the issues that divide the nation. As such,
there is a hollownessto Sunstein'scall for courtsto recognizeinherent limits in their authority. Does it cloak his desire for courts to
play an active role in shaping public policy, a desire grounded in
judicialsupremacy?Perhapsnot.49 But, as the next part will show,
there is very little in One Case at a Timeto suggest otherwise.
III.

SHAPING

CONSTITUTIONAL

VALUES

The Constitution'stext, its originalintent, and interveningpractice supportthree-branchinterpretation.50For this reason, as Ruth
Bader Ginsburgobserved,"[J]udgesplay an interdependentpart in
our democracy. They do not alone shape legal doctrinebut... they
participatein a dialoguewith other organsof government,and with
the people as well."5' But how should judges participatein constitutional dialogueswith elected officialsand the people? More precisely, should judges, as Sunstein suggests, encourage democratic
deliberationthrough ambiguous,incompletelytheorized opinions?
No doubt, as the priorsection underscores,inherentlimitsin the
judicial role make it sensible for the Court (at least some of the
time) to issue narrow and shallow decisions. But these are pragmatic restraints,not driven by some grand theory of democracyforcingjudicial review. As such, they apply in a sporadic, ad hoc
manner, allowing the Court to issue "maximalist"decisions when
the circumstanceswarrantit. Sunstein's call for across-the-board
minimalism,on the other hand, is groundedin a normativevision
- democracy-forcingjudicial review. In assessing Sunstein'snormative theory, two questionsthereforeremain: First,can the Court
craft minimalistdoctrine in such a way as to promote democratic
deliberation? Second,if it can, shouldit? The answerto both questions, as this section will suggest, is no.
The Court's power to alter the course of democraticdeliberation is premisedon the belief that people pay attentionto the Court
49. In an article entitled Leaving Things Undecided, Sunstein spoke of the synergies between his and Bickel's work. "The project of the minimalist judge," wrote Sunstein, "is easily
linked with the project of exemplifying the 'passive virtues,' a project that is associated with a
court's refusal to assume jurisdiction." Sunstein, supra note 34, at 51.
50. For a sketch of why this is so, see Devins & Fisher, supra note 6, at 85-90.
51. Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 1198.
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(not simplythe holdingsof cases but the Justices'reasoningas well).
The sad truth, however, is that the public is generally unaware of
Court decisionmaking.52Correspondingly,it may be that media
outlets, although reporting the Court's decisions, do not see the
Court as an agenda setter; that is, coverage of an issue (school desegregation,for example) is not tied to landmarkSupreme Court
decisionmaking (Brown).53 More telling, it is unclear whether
lawmakerspay much attention to court decisionmaking. Six years
ago, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and Congress agreed that
the Clerkof the Courtought to informCongressof instanceswhere
the D.C. Circuitconstrueda congressionalstatute.54The reason for
this reform: Congresswas not paying attention to these decisions,
some of which invalidated or severely constrained Congress's
handiwork.55
When Congress does listen, moreover, it rarely considers the
Court'sreasoning. Instead,its focus is on whetherthe Court'sdecision stands as a roadblockto reform. Fact-specific,indeterminate,
incompletely theorized minimalist decisionmakingdoes not stand
as a roadblockto anything. Rather, memberswho supportthe result reached by the Court will treat minimalistdecisionmakingas
something quite maximalistwhile members who oppose the outcome will characterizesuch decisions as inconsequential. In the
end, when the Courtleaves issues undecided,lawmakerswill simply
chart a course to the outcome they prefer.
This is the lesson of the Supreme Court's 1995 Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena56 decision. Insisting that federal, as well

as state, affirmative action programs be "narrowlytailored" to
serve a "compellinggovernmentalinterest,"57Adarand tightened
the standardsgoverning affirmativeaction. Rather than apply this
standard,however, the Court sent the dispute back to the district
court where it originated. More significantly,the Justices neither
repudiated diversity-basedaffirmativeaction nor prohibited governmentfrom "actingin response"to "boththe practiceand lingering effects of racial discrimination."58In this way, Adarand is a
52. See David Adamany & Joel B. Grossman, Support for the Supreme Court as National
Policymaker, 5 LAW& POLICYQ. 405, 407 (1983) (citing studies).
53. See ROSENBERG,
supra note 29, at 111-16.
54. See ROBERTA. KATZMANN, COURTSAND CONGRESS
69-81 (1997).
55. This experiment has "not caused any flurry of legislative action" perhaps because
Congress is still not paying much attention. Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not be
Advicegivers: A Response to Professor Neal Katyal, 50 STAN.L. REV. 1825, 1828 (1998).
56. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
57. 515 U.S. at 227.
58. 515 U.S. at 237. See also Neal Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the
Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decisionmaking, 37 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 673 (1996) (criticizing Adarand for saying so little).
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quintessentiallyminimalistopinion and, not surprisingly,Sunstein
praises it for its shallowness(pp. 124, 130-32).
But, by saying so little, Adarandleaves it to lawmakersto spin
the decision to fit their needs. Inside the Washington, D.C.
beltway,where affirmativeaction is entrenched,Adarandis of little
consequence, if any at all. A vivid illustrationof this reality occurredin July1995when SenatorPhil Grammproposedeliminating
set-asidesfor minoritiesand women in federal contracting.59In defending this measure, Gramm explained that "my amendment is

written in total conformity with Adarand. . . . That is, if the court

finds that a contractorwas [personally]subject to discrimination,
the court may provide a remedy with a set-aside ....

"60 In sharp

contrast,Senator Arlen Specter called attention to Adarand'srecognition that the government may act in response to "both the
practiceand the lingeringeffects of racialdiscrimination."61Along
these lines, Senator Patty Murraycountered Gramm's efforts by
proposing that federal funds can only be used for "programs...
completely consistent with the Supreme Court'srecent decision in
... Adarand."62 In the end, the Murray amendment was approved

by a lopsided eighty-fourto thirteen vote and the Grammamendment was soundly defeated by a bipartisansixty-one to thirty-six
vote.
By not placing meaningfulconstraintson elected officials,decisions like Adarandsuggest that minimalistdecisionmakingmay be
a lot of smoke with very little fire. As such, the principalconsequence of minimalistdecisionmakingmay be the delegationof decisionmakingauthorityaway from the Supreme Court and to lower
federal courts. For example, by recalibratingthe Supreme Court's
careful parsingof words in Adarand,some lower courts have concluded that diversity-based preferences are unconstitutional.63
Along the same lines, because courtswill constantlybe fillingin the
gaps left by fact-specificrulings,minimalistdecisionmakingforces
courts to actively oversee elected government. Correspondingly,
since lawmakersand regulatorswill not know what is and is not
constitutional,courts will inevitablyfind themselves in the thick of
the policymakingsoup. Over time, of course, a societal consensus
59. 141 CONG.REC. S10,401 (daily ed. July 20, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
60. Id. at S10,408 (statement of Sen. Gramm).
61. Id. at S10,409 (statement of Sen. Specter).
62. Id. at S10,405 (statement of Sen. Murray).
63. The most vivid example of this is Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-48 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). This, of course, begs the question of whether the
Supreme Court has a responsibility to guide lower courts through clear standards, if not
rules. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30
CONN.L. REV. 961, 992-93 (1998); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399,
401 n.6 (1985).
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may be reached, promptingthe Court to issue a maximalistdecision.64 Until that time, however, courts are more apt to function as
technocrats,speaking narrowlyto the question before them, than
they are to prompt constructivedemocraticdiscourse.
But even if Courtdecisionsshape democraticdeliberation,there
is reason to doubt that minimalist decisionmakingis, ultimately,
more democracy-forcing than majoritarianism. After all, the
Court's unqualified approval of governmental decisionmaking
leaves it to lawmakersand the people to define for themselves the
reaches and limits of constitutionalprotections. Consider,for example, the willingness of democratic institutions to correct
majoritariandecisionmaking.Startingwith ThomasJefferson'sdeclaration that the Alien and Sedition Acts, which criminalized
speech critical of the government,were unconstitutionaland that
every person convicted under the sedition law ought to be
pardoned,65presidentshave countermandedmajoritariandecisionmaking. Andrew Jackson's veto of legislation rechartering the
Bank of the United States, Ronald Reagan's refusalto sign legislation codifying the fairness doctrine, and Bill Clinton's repeal of
anti-abortionregulationsare examplesof this phenomenon.66Congress, too, has expanded constitutionalprotections in the face of
Supreme Court decisions curtailingindividualrights,includinglegislation limiting third-partysearches of newspapers;legislation authorizingdisparateimpact proofs in voting rights and employment
discriminationlegislation;legislation authorizingthe assignmentof
women to combat aircraft;legislation allowing federal employees,
includingmembers of the armed services, to wear an item of religious apparel on their clothing; and much, much more.67 Rather
64. The Supreme Court may well prefer this state of affairs. For example, it can issue a
shallow decision on affirmative action, gay rights, or states' rights. If a societal consensus
supporting a deep decision emerges, the Court can treat its earlier decision as a wedge, that
is, the Court can subsequently redescribe that precedent in maximalist terms. See Posner,
supra note 18, at 9-10 (suggesting that some of the decisions that Sunstein describes as minimalist are, in fact, wedge decisions). On the other hand, if the Court later decides that it
would be a mistake to issue a deep decision, its earlier decision can be treated as a shallow
minimalist holding. An example of this phenomenon is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). When decided, Griswold seemed to speak more to the marital bedroom than, say,
abortion rights. Today, of course, Griswold is often depicted as a maximalist decision. Judge
Bork, for example, labeled Griswold as the embodiment of "unprincipled" judicial activism.
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
9 (1971).
65. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 907
(noting that the effect of Jefferson's pardon was to nullify the statutes "as much as if the
Supreme Court had held them unconstitutional").
66. See DEVINS,supra note 25, at 14 (discussing the bank veto), 35 (discussing the fairness
veto), 115-18 (discussing the repeal of anti-abortion regulations, including abortion counseling and fetal tissue research).
67. See FISHER& DEVINS,supra note 27, at 3 (discussing newsroom protections), 283-302
(discussing employment), 322-33 (discussing women in the military); 10 U.S.C. ? 774 (1994)
(addressing religious apparel in the military).
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than view the Court's decision as the last word, elected officials,
after engagingin constitutionalinterpretation,have chosen to limit
themselves in ways that the Court would not limit them.
Majoritarianism,therefore, cannot simply be dismissedas antithetical to Sunstein's project of democracy-forcingconstitutional
deliberation. But even if minimalismis more democracy-forcing
than majoritarianism,there is reason to doubt the Court'sabilityto
conduct this enterprise in the real world. Consider, for example,
the Court's recent decisions upholding state bans on physicianassisted suicide.68Sunstein applaudsthe democracy-forcingnature
of these decisions, noting that the Justices,by suggestingthat state
authoritymay be limited but not specifyingwhen this may be the
case, created incentives for both sides of the debate to engage in
democratic deliberation (pp. 93-99). Yet, since courts must give
reasonsfor their holdings,an incompletelytheorizedminimalistdecision would still speak to the legitimacyof state regulations. In this
way, minimalistdecisionmakingwould necessarily affect the content of democraticdiscourse,especiallyif the Court - in filling in
the gaps of earlier decisions - finds itself a repeat player on an

issue.

Courts, moreover, may face an array of possible options and
outcomes, each of which might be deemed minimalist. How then
should courtschoose between competingminimalistdecisions? For
example, as Mark Tushnet argues, a minimalist decision striking
down the assisted suicide bans might have been more democracyforcing "by assuringthat democraticconsiderationof the issue was
not obstructedby inertia or other proceduralimpedimentsto public, and particularlylegislative, discussion."69Along these lines,
given the burden of inertia (which makes it more difficultto enact
legislationthan to defeat the enactmentof legislation),a minimalist
decision invalidatingassisted suicide prohibitionswould promote
democratic deliberation if "right-to-life"interests (who support
such laws) have substantiallymore political power than "choice-indying" interests. Under this scenario, "choice-in-dying"interests,
althoughlackingthe power to compel serious legislativeconsideration of their reform agenda, might be able to force legislative consideration of their argumentsif politically powerful "right-to-life"
interests would have to overcome the burden of legislative inertia.
The flip side of this coin, of course, is that a decision upholding
assistedsuicide prohibitionswould foster democraticdeliberationif
68. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702

(1997).
69. Mark Tushnet, How to Deny a Constitutional Right: Reflections on the Assisted Suicide Cases, 1 GREENBAG 2D 55, 57 (1997).
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"choice-in-dying"interestshad more politicalpower than "right-tolife" interests.
But can courts sort out which side of a divisive issue has more
political power? Sometimes discrete and insular minorities, who
have certain organizationaladvantages, have substantial political
power.70Also, in states with direct democracyprocedures,political
power may be defined by public opinion. Should courts take opinion polls? And what happensif politicalpower varies from state to
state? Should courts opt for the solution that maximizes democratic deliberationin the majorityof states? Or should it focus on
the most populated states? Or should it care the most about states
that it deems parochial?
Sunstein does not suggest that courts should do any of these
things. But he does rejectthe propositionthat courtsought to defer
to democraticprocesses, dubbing majoritarianisma form of maximalism (p. x). Apparently, Sunstein'spreferred system is one in
which judges make seat-of-the-pantscalls about the political marketplace. On the one hand, "if the Court cannot identify malfunctions in the system of deliberative democracy" and "if very
reasonable people can [disagree]" (p. 76), courts should either
"leave things undecided" or defer to "reasonable"political judgments (p. 103). On the other hand, "the existence of political inequality" (p. 103) or possible bias (pp. 133-34) supports more
intrusive judicial review.71 The problem here, of course, is that
judges' values and beliefs will play a large part in sorting out
whether there are defects in the political marketplace.72
Perhaps I am being unfair. Sunstein's claim is that minimalist
decisionmaking promotes democratic deliberation, not that
minimalismis perfect. That judges will have difficultydetermining
which side should win, among other things, should not overshadow
the virtues of democracy-forcingminimalism. Courts are apt to
make mistakes anyway. So a system which promotes democratic
deliberationmust be better than the alternatives.
But this simply begs the question: Why democratic deliberation? The answer does not come from the Constitution'stext, the
framers' intent, or tradition. Those sources, more than anything,
speak of a system of checks and balances,with each branchasserting its own powers and protectingits own prerogatives. More fun70. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 728
(1985) (discussing, among other things, the power of voting blocs).
71. In this way, Sunstein's argument is reminiscent of John Hart Ely's classic defense of
the nonminimalist Warren Court in JOHNHART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST(1980).
72. Mark Tushnet condemns minimalism for this very reason, arguing that "minimalism
asks judges to make precisely those judgments that its premise[] [that political judgments are

best left to publicdiscussion]assert[s]judges should not make." Tushnet,supranote 69, at
60.
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damentally, as a freestanding normative theory, minimalism is
flawed. There are occasions where courts ought to speak about
right and wrong on highly contested divisive social issues.
Judges, thanks principally to life tenure, are less likely to be
driven by political expediency than elected officials. Moreover, because courts must offer reasons for their decisions, judges are more
apt to take seriously their responsibility in advancing logical coherent arguments. In other words, just as courts have institutional
weaknesses, they have institutional strengths.73 In particular, more
than any other part of the government, courts are more apt "to appeal to men's better natures, to call forth their aspirations,"74and
"to be a voice of reason ... articulating and developing impersonal
and durable principles."75
Judges, of course, are not philosopher kings. But their willingness to speak about principle can be salutary, even if the principles
they identify are wrongheaded. No branch should be the final arbiter of the Constitution's meaning. Rather, the Constitution is made
more vibrant and, ultimately, more stable by a give and take process. Just as the courts need elected government to implement their
decisions, Congress and the White House need the courts, as well as
each other. This is the logic of our system of checks and balances,
that "the effectiveness of the whole depends on [each branch's] involvement with one another . . . even if it often is the sweaty intimacy of creatures locked in combat."76
More specifically, by sometimes invoking high-sounding
principles when striking down elected government action, courts
are well positioned to validate governmental decisionmaking.
Charles L. Black, Jr. has explained the way this works: "What a
government of limited powers needs, at the beginning and forever,
is some means of satisfying the people that it has taken all steps
humanly possible to stay within its powers.... [T]he Court, through
its history, has acted as the legitimator of government."77 In other
words, by speaking about right and wrong, judges can perform their
most important task - affirming and legitimating the actions of
elected government. In contrast, ambiguous, fact-specific, minimalist decisionmaking purposefully lacks moral force. As a result, a
minimalist judge cannot really validate governmental
decisionmaking.
73. Sunstein acknowledges this, although he concludes that, more than anything, judicial
insulation makes "it less legitimate for judges to choose what to do in the face of factual
uncertainty." P. 103.
74. BICKEL,supra note 4, at 26
75. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84,
99 (1959).
76. BICKEL,supra note 4, at 261.
77. CHARLESL. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLEAND THECOURTS52 (1960).
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Beyond these institutionaladvantages,there are other reasons
that courtsmight sometimes issue wide and deep decisions. In particular,dialoguesbetween the Court and elected officialsmust take
context into account. A democracy-forcingdecision assumes that
the political marketplacecan work. That, however, is not always
the case. Sometimes,for example, elected officialsneed the Court
to play a leadershiprole. Late 1960svoting rightsdecisionsupholding congressionalreformsgave cover to Southernofficialswillingto
comply with the new policy but unwillingto take responsibilityfor
it.78 In 1983, a logjam between Congress and the White House

could only be broken by a Supreme Court declarationthat racist
private schools were not entitled to tax breaks.79
Admittedly,there are risks in seeing the courts as fixers. Sometimes the courts may see a failure in the political marketplacethat
isn't really there; other times elected officialsmay find it expedient
to punt their duties as constitutional interpreters. Nevertheless,
there is a rigidity to democracy-forcingminimalismthat seems at
odds with our system of checks and balances. Dialogues between
the branchesare ongoing and require a certain amount of give and
take, includingcontextual decisionmaking.
None of this is to say that courts ought to be value-ladenflamethrowers. Inherent limits in the judicial function support delaying
strategies, including minimalist decisionmaking.80 But courts
should sometimes eschew incompletely theorized agreements and
democracy-forcingstrategies. If courts think segregationis morally
repugnantor that life does (or does not) begin at conception,why
favor a strategythat leaves it to democraticdeliberation. Why not
favor a strategyin which the Court - a coequal branchof government - cares about outcomes as well as processes? After all, democracy will ultimately prevail. If elected government and the
people disagree with the Court, they will countermand its
decisionmaking.81
IV.

CONCLUSION

Constitutionaldecisionmakingis a never-endingprocess involving all partsof the governmentand the people as well. One Caseat
a Time,to its credit, recognizesthat no part of governmentholds a
monopoly over the Constitution. Moreover,in calling attention to
inherent limits in judicial review, Sunstein rightlysuggests that the
Court ought to move incrementally,issuingnarrowand shallow de78. See Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court,
84 Nw. U. L. REV. 985, 1017 (1990).
79. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
80. See sources cited supra notes 18-29.
81. See sources cited supra notes 27-29.
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cisions. Nevertheless, One Case at a Timeis incomplete. In some
ways, it goes too far in discountingthe virtues of judicial review,
especially with regard to occasions when the judiciaryshould embrace some interpretivetheory of what the Constitutionmeans and
thereby play a leadershiprole in the shaping of constitutionalvalues. In other ways, it does not go far enough. In failing to detail
how (and whether) a minimalistCourt ought to make use of the
"passive virtues," Sunstein never comes to terms with how the
Court'sinstitutionalstrengthsand weaknessesshould shapejudicial
review.

One Case at a Time is incomplete for other reasons as well.
Most striking, by hinging his theory of judicial minimalismon a
handfulof RehnquistCourtdecisions,Sunsteinopens himselfto attack on several fronts. First,if some of these decisionscan be characterizedas maximalist(or if Rehnquist Court decisionmakingnot
consideredby Sunsteincan be characterizedas maximalist),there is
reason to question the verity and portabilityof his model.82 Second, even if his case analyses are sound, One Case at a Timerelies
on too few data points to be truly convincing. Rehnquist Court
decisionmaking on affirmative action, physician-assistedsuicide,
and gender discriminationdoes not occur in a vacuum. These decisions are part of a larger mosaic of cases and, as such, should be
consideredin this broader context.83Third (and correspondingly),
by focusing on 1990s decisionmaking,One Case at a Time is too
temporal. What would Sunsteinsay about the maximalistdecisions
of the WarrenCourt? Did decisions on, say, reapportionmentfoster or impede democraticdeliberation? Moreover,given Sunstein's
left-leaning politics, his efforts at depicting the right-leaning
Rehnquist Court as minimalist invites suspicion. Specifically, is
Sunstein'sobjectiveto prevent the RehnquistCourtfrom going too
far or is One Case at a Time a book for the ages (one that would
condemn the maximalistdecisionmakingof the WarrenCourt)?
When all is said and done, One Caseat a Timehas the vices and
virtues of a tactician'seffort to solve a problem before him. By
giving short shrift both to institutionaland interpretivetheories of
judicial review,84Sunstein's defense of judicial minimalismis less
82. Some of Sunstein's case analyses (including his choice of case studies) can be challenged on these grounds. See supra notes 16-17, 43-45.
83. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text (depicting Brown and its progeny as
part of a larger mosaic).
84. Unlike Bickel, who linked his call for the "passive virtues" with a desire for the Court
to ground their decisionmaking (in those cases where they did speak) in interpretive theories,
Sunstein strongly opposes any delineation of transcendent "neutral principles." Consequently, where Bickel was criticized for "100% insistence on principle, 20% of the time,"
Sunstein seems to ask for 0% principle 100% of the time. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle
Vices of the "Passive Virtues"- A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review,
64 COLUM.L. REV. 1, 3 (1964).
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than convincing. Too many questions are left unansweredand, as
such, Sunstein'sargumentseems, well, too incompletelytheorized.
To his credit,however, Sunsteinpulls off a near-impossiblefeat. At
a time when both the left and right call for a diminishingjudicial
role, Sunsteinsomehow managesto chart a "consensus"course for
active judicialreview. Callingattentionto the inherentlimits of judicial review, Sunstein's plea for narrow, shallow decisionmaking
appeals to conservativeswho prefer cost-benefitanalysisto valuesbased decisionmaking.85But Sunstein also appeals to the sentiments that made the left like activist judicial review in the first
place. He contends, for example, that minimalistreview will be of
particularuse to underrepresentedgroups and that minimalistreview compels lawmakers to justify the reasonableness of their
decisionmaking.86

Ultimately, One Case at a Timemay be understoodas a necessary complement to Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous
Branch. In particular,by calling attention to how it is that narrow
and shallow decisionmaking operates as a delaying strategy,
Sunstein makes clear that democraticdecisionmakingand judicial
review can complement each other. That Sunstein's call for
democracy-forcingjudicial review is a nonstarter does not cast
doubt on this achievement. In other words,while the particularsof
One Case at a Timemay not stand the test of time, Sunstein'scall
for narrowand shallow decisionmakingmay prove a critical (if incomplete) bridge between the "passivevirtues"and active judicial
review.

85. See Posner, supra note 18, at 9 (describing his approach as "similar" to that of
Sunstein).
86. See supra text accompanying note 71.

